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1968] ALCOHOLISM AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 909
accepting commercial advertisements (like building a terminal or
school auditorium) the district has provided a facility that could
reasonably be used for the expression of first amendment rights. It
need not establish the facility. Once it does, however, it should
not be allowed to reject advertisements protected by the first amend-
ment and for which space is available unless it can show that to
accept them would intolerably burden the busses and interfere with
their primary purpose for providing transportation.
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS
Constitutional Law-Chronic Alcoholism
and the Eighth Amendment in North Carolina
A man gets up in the morning and the first thing he does is to
"take a drink." From that point on throughout the day he is con-
stantly "taking a drink." By mid-afternoon or early evening, he is
picked up by the police for public drunkenness. Far from being his
first "offense," this series of events has happened to him many times
before-sometimes ending with arrest and sometimes not. This
man is a chronic alcoholic; he suffers from a disease and has no
control over his behavior.' Should he be punished as a "public
drunk" or is it "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth
amendment to do so? Recently several courts across the nation
have faced this question and reached conflicting results. The fol-
lowing is a brief attempt to highlight these decisions and some
future problems raised therein.
The first such case was Driver v. Hinnant.2 Defendant had
been found guilty of a violation of a North Carolina statute mak-
ing it a misdemeanor for "any person ... [to] be found drunk or
intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meet-
ing," 3 and sentenced to two year's imprisonment. Driver had been
convicted of the same offense over 200 times previously. On ap-
peal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion
that the sentences were authorized by the statute and therefore that
See authorities collected in Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 n. 6
(4th Cir. 1966).
-356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). See also, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 818 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953). As will be shown and discussed,
infra, this statute underwent significant amendment in 1967,
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conviction thereunder was not cruel and unusual punishment.4 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina denied a writ of Habeas Corpus,5 but on appeal the Fourth
Circuit held that the conviction was unconstitutional as cruel and
unusual punishment." The court said that chronic alcoholism "is
now almost universally accepted medically as a disease,"7 the symp-
toms of which may appear as "disorder or behavior."" Since this
includes unwilled and ungovernable appearances in public by the
victim, no judgement of criminal conviction can be based thereon.
It is cruel and unusual punishment to brand him a criminal, irre-
spective of consequent detention or fine, for those acts "which are
compulsive as symptomatic of the disease."'
The Driver case was followed soon thereafter by the District
of Columbia Circuit in Easter v. District of Columbia.10 Easter had
been found guilty of being "drunk and intoxicated" on a Washington
street in violation of D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-128(a) (1961)-the
court ruling that chronic alcoholism was not a defense. He was
given a 90 day suspended sentence.'1 Hearing the appeal en banc,
the Court of Appeals held that chronic alcoholism is not itself a
crime and is a defense to a charge of public intoxication in Wash-
ington, D.C.'" Furthermore, since "it is the fact of criminal con-
'State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
'Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
6 356 F.2d at 765.
7Id. at 764.
a Id.
'Id. The Fourth Circuit felt that the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), sustained,
if not commanded, the view they enforced. In that case it was held that
drug addiction was an illness and a statute punishing such an involuntarily
assumed "status" was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment. Id. at 667. See 27 LA. L. REv. 340, 346-47 (1967)
where the foregoing conclusion is challenged as misplaced reliance. See
also 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 145 (1967) where it is pointed out that Driver
extends the immunity from criminal prosecution from statia-a passive
state of being, to acts symptomatic of the disease-overt action. That is,
the North Carolina statute punished an involuntary symptom of a status,
public intoxication.
10361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
111d. at 51.
" Id. While the entire court felt that Congress in passing the Rehabilita-
tion of Alcoholics Act Ch. 472, 61 Stat. 744, c. 472 (1947), D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-501 to -514 (1967), intended that alcoholics not be punished
for public drunkenness and therefore commanded the result reached, four
of the eight judges also felt the result was constitutionally commanded, citing
Driver as authority. 361 F.2d at 55.
[Vol. 46
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viction that is critical," 13 it was immaterial that the sentence had
been suspended.' 4
Although the Driver and Easter cases are perhaps indicative of a
trend in judicial thought, more recent state court pronouncements
have maintained the position that such a conviction is not cruel and
unusual punishment. In People v. Hoy, 5 the Michigan court said:
"[W]hile we are aware that some courts have recently held it is
cruel and unusual punishment to sentence to prison a chronic al-
coholic on a charge of drunk and disorderliness, such decisions are
not controlling precedent for this court and we decline to adopt
them. . ,1 One of the reasons given for this position was in-
sufficient persuasion in the record that defendant was a chronic al-
coholic. Therefore, since Driver and Easter did not hold that the
punishment for public drunkenness was cruel and unusual, but rather
that the conviction and punishment of a chronic alcoholic was un-
constitutional, this Michigan case may not be a true test of the
Driver-Easter principle." However, in Budd v. California8 the
record involved was similar to that in Driver and Easter. There
was testimony that Budd had been an alcoholic for over thirty
years and that he had lost control over the use of intoxicating
beverages. The trial court made no finding as to whether defen-
dant was a chronic alcoholic, saying that such a finding was not
pertinent. He was thus convicted under CAL. PENAL STAT. §
647(f) (Supp. 1967) providing in part that any person "found in
any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . .
in such a condition that he is -unable to exercise care for his own
safety or that of others" is guilty of a misdemeanor. Budd then
challenged the conviction and imprisonment as cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment by seeking a writ of
Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. The writ was
denied and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to
review the California Supreme Court action. 9 The possibility of
final constitutional determination by the Supreme Court on this
question was thus temporarily eliminated. However, another op-
361 F.2d at 55.
"Id.
143 N.W.2d 577 (Mich. App. 1966).
2" 143 N.W.2d at 578.
" See 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 250, 257 (1967).
21 Cert. deinied, 385 U.S. 909 (1966).
10 Id.
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portunity for the Supreme Court to rule on the question has been
presented in Powell v. Texas, now awaiting decision-oral argu-
ment having been heard. 0
Regardless of the state of this issue in other jurisdictions, it is
a settled question in North Carolina. The Fourth Circuit's de-
cision in Driver is binding here unless and until the Supreme Court
reaches a different result. Furthermore, the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly in 1967 amended its "public drunkenness" statute.21
As far as relevant here, that amendment reads:
(c) Chronic alcoholism shall be an affirmative defense to the
charge of public drunkenness. For the purpose of this section,
chronic alcoholism shall be as defined in article 7A of chapter
122. When the defense of chronic alcoholism is shown to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact, and a judgment by reason of
chronic alcoholism is entered, the court may follow the treatment
procedures outlined in article 7A of chapter 122.22
20 Powell v. Texas, 36 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. March 12, 1968). Coun-
sel for appellant argued only that the chronic alcoholic cannot be con-
victed, expressly refusing to question the right of a police officer to
arrest the chronic alcoholic, place him in jail, and have him subjected to
trial. Amici curiae argument against constitutionality agreed with appel-
lant's counsel with the one qualification that, when a police officer is
familiar with the chronic alcoholic, questions concerning probable cause
for arrest may arise. Counsel for the state of Texas attempted to impress
upon the court the "revolutionary implications" of holding that the con-
viction is unconstitutional. Appellee suggests that if a chronic alcoholic
cannot be convicted of public intoxication, he will not be amenable to other
criminal laws either. He concluded his argument by explaining that if a
chronic alcoholic cannot be sent to jail, the court must either allow him to
remain on the streets or subject him to involuntary civil commitment. The
latter is neither wholly effective nor wholly constitutional, he argues, while
the former would endanger the alcoholic's health and life and would be
more cruel than sending him to jail.21 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (Supp. 1967).2 Id. As defined in article 7A of chapter 122, a chronic alcoholic is
any person found by any court to have the illness or condition known as
chronic alcoholism. Chronic alcoholism is the chronic and habitual use of
alcoholic beverages to the extent of losing the power of self-control with
respect to the use of such beverages. Any court having jurisdiction over
a chronic alcoholic may provide for treatment through any one or more
of the following actions: (1) order the clerk of the superior court to
commence judicial hospitalization as per article 7 of chapter 122, (2) direct,
in cooperation with a family member or other responsible person, the making
and following of plans for treatment in a private facility or program ap-
proved by the North Carolina Department of Mental Health, (3) refer him
to a private physician or psychiatrist or to a hospital diagnostic center or
to a private or social welfare organization, (4) request such as the local
department of public welfare to work with the chronic alcoholic and make
reports as to his treatment or condition as requested, (5) make or approve
any other appriate plan and require for as long as appropriate to treatment
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Though obviously under some compulsion to bring the statute in
line with the Fourth Circuit's ruling, this amendment demonstrates
a praiseworthy understanding of the plight in which the chronic
alcoholic has traditionally found himself.
The North Carolina Supreme Court also is to be commended
for its application of this statute in State v. Pardon.23 Prior to the
passage of the above amendment, the defendant was arrested and
charged with his fourteenth offense of public drunkenness within
twelve months. Having pleaded guilty, he was examined in the su-
perior court for the purpose of determining sentence. Though the
examination and investigation revealed him to be a chronic alco-
holic, 24 the court, seeing no alternative, sentenced him to eight
months in jail.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court remanded for a
new trial in light of the intervening statute. The court said that
since judgment is not final as long as the appeal is pending, "the
appellate court must dispose of the case under the law in force
when its decision is given, even although to do so requires the re-
versal of a judgment which was right when rendered."2'5  The
court reasoned that the rule prohibiting ex post facto legislation only
prevents aggravation of punishment, not all changes. Therefore
it is not an invalid ex post facto application of the amendment to
allow defendant the defense of chronic alcoholism at this stage.
The legislature may always remove a burden imposed upon citizens
for state purposes.26 Thus defendant was granted a new trial and
an opportunity to prove the affirmative defense of chronic alco-
holism.
Though North Carolina is now firmly committed to the more
enlightened approach, the trial advocate's problems with the eighth
amendment are just beginning. Numerous questions arise con-
submission of periodic reports as to his treatment or condition, in the courts
discretion. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122- 65.6 to -65.9 (Supp. 1967).
-'272 N.C. 72, 157 S.E.2d 698 (1967).
-" He had been convicted of public drunkenness over fifty times; he bad
been in institutions for alcoholics in Missouri and Kentucky; he had a record
of traffic violations, larceny, vagrancy, gambling, trespass, forgery and other
offenses. At the time arrested he was a patient at the Veterans Hospital
in Durham but was home on a "weekend pass." That hospital refused to
readmit him after this conviction. Id.
2 Id. at 76, 157 S.E.2d at 701, citing Gulf, Col. & S. F. Ry. v. Dennis,
224 U.S. 503, 506 (1912).
20 Id. at 76, 157 S.E.2d at 701.
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cerning the application and possible extensions of the Fourth Cir-
cuit's rationale. Must the defense be raised by counsel or may
the judge raise it on his own motion ?7 The vagueness of the limit-
ing factor of the Driver case, i.e., "acts symptomatic of the disease,"
may be susceptible to unlimited interpretations."8 What is the effect
of the court's 9 likening the movements of an alcoholic to those of
an imbecile or person in a delirium fever ? It has been said that an
alcoholic's presence in public is not a willful act and thus evil in-
tent and consciousness of wrong-doing, indispensible elements of a
crime, are missing. This raises the question whether chronic al-
coholism may be extended as a defense to crimes in general and,
if so, when, to what crimes and to what extent. 1 Once the chronic
alcoholic is protected from criminal prosecution, it becomes a prob-
lem as to what treatment or handling is both possible and desirable,
"See, e.g., Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling the Chronic Court Of-
fender: The Challenge of the Courts, 19 S.C.L. REv. 305, 309-11 (1967).
"See, e.g., Starrs, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional
Criminal Law Theory, 19 S.C.L. REV. 349, 354 (1967); 1966 Dux LJ.
545, 554-55 (1966) ; 27 LA. L. REv. 340, 346 (1967) ; 12 S.D.L. REv. at 146
(1967), See also argument of appellee, note 20 supra.
29 356 F.2d at 764; 361 F.2d at 54.
20 See, e.g., Deddens, Volitional Fault and the Intoxicated Criminal Of-
fender, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 258, 281-85 (1967); 20 Agiu. L. REv. 365, 367
(1966); Note, 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 147 (1967).
" See, e.g., Deddens, supra note 30; Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling
the Chronic Court Offender: The Challenge of the Courts, 19 S.C.L. REv.
305, 306, 330-31 (1967); Hutt, Recent Forensic Developments in the Field
of Alcoholism, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 343, 345-47, 350 (1967); Slovenko,
Alcoholism and the Criminal Law, 6 WAsHBuRN LJ. 269, 279-81 (1967);
Starrs, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional Criminal Law
Theory, 19 S.C.L. REv. 349, 356-69 (1967) ; Tao, Drunkenness and Criminal
Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 530, 539-540, 544-45 (1967) ; 20 ARK. L. REV. 365,
368-70 (1966); 16 DEPAUL L. REv. 493 (1967); 1966 DuKE L.J. 545, 555-
56; 52 IowA L. REV. 492, 495-97 (1966); 27 LA. L. REV. 340, 344-46
(1967); 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 147-48 (1967). It is also interesting to note
that "chronic alcoholic" as defined by the court may well come within the
traditional definition of "involuntary drunk." Since drunkenness is pre-
sumed to be voluntary unless some special circumstance is established to
remove it from that category, "involuntary drunkenness" is most easily
defined in the negative. If the intoxicating character of the liquor or drug
is not understood or known to be present or if the liquor or drug is taken
under duress or medical advice, the resulting condition is usually said to be
involuntary. This characterization is not all-inclusive. There are instances
where a person has become intoxicated without doing so intentionally or
recklessly, and though the above factors were missing, it was held to be
involuntary. A state of involuntary intoxication establishes that the derange-
ment is without culpability and hence is dealt with as if it were the result
of mental disease or defect. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 782-87 (1957).
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i.e., compulsory or voluntary, where, how long, etc." Should a
court be allowed discretion whether to treat such alcoholics civily
or criminally ?' 3 More general considerations which the General
Assembly, the courts and counsel for chronic alcoholics must face
involve the psychology of an alcoholic34 and the use of alcohol and
its relation to crime generally.3" These questions will have to be met
and solved through legislative action and the adversary system and
it is hoped the articles here cited will be of some help to the legis-
lator and trial advocate in this process.
SAm G. GRzIMEs
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech in the Military
On graduation from college Henry Howe was commissioned
as a Second Lieutenant in the U. S. Army Reserve. After being on
active duty about one year he found himself assigned to Fort Bliss
in El Paso, Texas. While he was stationed there, on November 6,
1965, he participated in a demonstration opposing the war in Viet-
nam. The degree of his protest as well as the fact of his involvement
caused him to be brought before a general court-martial, resulting in
an end to his short military career and his imprisonment for one
year.'
The demonstration was planned and organized by a group of
students and professors from El Paso State College as a protest
"against American policy." The marchers had requested permis-
sion from the city council to conduct a side-walk demonstration
82 See, e.g., Deddens, supra note 30; Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling the
Chronic Court Offender: The Challenge of the Courts, 19 S.C.L. REv. 305,
312-23 (1967); Hutt, Recent Forensic Developments in the Field of Alco-
holism, 8 Wm. & MARy L. IREv. 342, 351-58 (1967). Murtagh, Arrests for
Public Intoxication, 35 FoaRRAm L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1966); Myerson and
Mayer, Origins, Treatment and Destiny of Skid Row Men, 19 S.C.L. REv.
332 (1967); Slovenko, supra note 31, at 281-84; Swarty, Compulsory Legal
Measures and the Concept of Illness, 19 S.C.L. Rtv. 372 (1967); Tao, supra
note 31, at 543, 545-47; 16 DE PAUL L. REv. 493, 495 (1967); 1966 DuKE
L.J. 545, 557-61; 52 IowA L. REv. 492, 497-99, 508-10 (1966); 27 LA. L.
REv. 340, 344 (1967); 18 S.C.L. REv. 504, 506-08 (1966); 12 S.D.L. Rtv.
142, 148-50 (1967).
"See, e.g., 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 150 (1967).
" See, e.g., Murtagh, supra note 32, at 9-10; 18 S.C.L. REv. 504, 505
(1966).
See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 31, at 271-72.
Court-Martial 413739.
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